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Thomas: Minimum Contacts Meets Cyberspace

NOTE
ROCHE v. WORLDWIDE MEDIA,
INC.: EVALUATING WHERE
MINIMUM CONTACTS MEETS
CYBERSPACE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc.,l the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia discussed
the issue of personal jurisdiction in the context of cyberspace. 2
The court determined that Worldwide Media's web site was
passive3 and that asserting personal jurisdiction based solely
on the maintenance of a web site, without more, would violate
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
The Roche decision reaffirmed the Eastern District of Virginia's position on personal jurisdiction in the context of
cyberspace. 5 Specifically, this decision applies the logic of the
"sliding scale"6 test borrowed from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and adopted
by the Eastern District of Virginia. 7 The "sliding scale" test
incorporates the spirit and intent of the International Shoe
"minimum contacts" test to address whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the operation
Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Va. 2000).
2 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
3 See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
4 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
5 See id. at 717.
6 See infra note 69.
7 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 717-718. See also Rannach, Inc. v. The Rannach
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (E.D. Va. 2000).
1
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of a web site alone is consistent with due process. 8

II.

FACTS

Brien Roche, hereinafter "Roche", is a trial attorney and a
citizen of Virginia. 9 Roche registered and received confirmation that Network Solutions, Inc. reserved the domain name
"triallawyer.com" in his name. 10 Some time after receipt of
this confirmation, Roche visited "traillawyer.com" expecting to
see an "under construction" notation on the web site.l1 Instead, Roche found that Worldwide Media, Inc, a Florida corporation, and Michael Howard Berkens, a Florida resident,
collectively "Worldwide", were already operating "traillawyer. com" as an adult pornographic web site. 12 Roche alleged that he was deeply offended and disgusted by his inadvertent viewing of the pornographic images portrayed on the
"traillawyer.com" site. 13
In actuality, Worldwide operated "triallawyer.com" as an
advertising venue for other Internet web site operators. 14 In
exchange for a fee,15 Worldwide placed advertising banners
with images depicting a variety of explicit sexual acts and behaviors on the "triallawyer.com" web site.1 6 Visitors to "triallawyer.com" were prompted to click on a banner if they
wished to view more material. 17 Each banner contained links
8 See Zippo Mfg. Co. u. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa.
1997). See also International Shoe Co. u. Washington, 326 U.S. 320 (1945).
9 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
10 See id. at 716. Network Solutions, Inc. is a domain name registry service
where an individual can purchase the rights to a given domain name on a first-come,
first-served basis for a $100 registration fee. See Panauision Int'l u. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1318 (1998).
11 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
12 See id. at 716.
13 See id.
14 Telephone interview with Alexander Rhodes, Attorney for Worldwide Media,
Inc., Associate, Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards, & Roehn, P.A. (October 5, 2000).
Worldwide also maintained three other Internet web sites, "triallawyers.com", "trialattorney.com", and "trial attorneys. com", that operated in a similar fashion. See id.
15 See id.
16 See Complaint of Plaintiff at '1110, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No.
99-1534-A). The web site "triallawyer.com" contained explicit images of oral, anal, and
group sex, and solicited the display of other forms of sexual behavior. See id.
17 See Telephone interview with Alexander Rhodes, supra note 14.
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to other pornographic web sites operated by independent third
parties. 18 The web site "triallawyer.com", however, did not solicit visitor's credit card information, or provide visitors with
Worldwide's contact information such as telephone number or
email address.1 9 Moreover, visitors could not send comments
to Worldwide or submit classified ads to be posted on the
"traillawyer.com" web site. 20 In short, "traillawyer.com" was
nothing more than a conduit responsible for redirecting Internet traffic to other pornographic web sites. 21

III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 15, 1999,22 Roche filed a five-count complaint
against Worldwide in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia. 23 The complaint alleged actual
and constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 24 Roche, however,
was unable to dispute Worldwide's ownership of the domain
name since he and Worldwide had each registered the domain
name "triallawyer.com" with separate yet equally legitimate
domain name registry services. 25 Roche's complaint also included a prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin
Worldwide from continuing to operate the site. 26
On December 1, 1999,27 Worldwide filed a motion to dismiss Roche's complaint alleging that the Eastern District of
Virginia lacked personal jurisdiction over Worldwide. 28 The
court granted the motion and the Eastern District of Virginia
See id.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See Complaint, 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 99-1534-A).
22 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 714-715.
23 See id. at 714.
24 See Complaint, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 99-1534-A).
25 See Telephone interview with Alexander Rhodes, supra note 14.
26 See Complaint, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 99-1534-A).
27 See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No.
99-1534-A).
28 See id. at 715. Worldwide Media, Inc. made the motion to dismiss pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2). Because the Eastern District lacked personal jurisdiction over
Worldwide, the court did not discuss the merit of the allegations in the complaint.
See id.
18
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dismissed Roche's complaint on January 4, 2000. 29 On March
27, 2000, the Eastern District of Virginia issued its Memorandum Opinion. 30
IV. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORICAL JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS UNDER PENNOYER V.
NEFF

Before a court can hear a case, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and the parties to
the action. 31 Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's ability
to assert jurisdiction over the parties to the action. 32 Histori-·
cally, personal jurisdiction was governed by the strict physical
presence requirements of Pennoyer v. Neff.33 In Pennoyer, the
United States Supreme Court limited personal jurisdiction of
a state court to instances where a non-resident defendant
owned property within the forum state or was served within
the forum state. 34 However, these limitations eventually
proved too rigid as advances in communication, technology,
and the advent of the corporation as a legal entity obviated
the need for parties in a commercial transaction to share the
same physlcallocation. 35
B. MODERN JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
SHOE V. VVASHINGTON

In 1945, the Supreme Court abandoned the strict physical
presence requirements of Pennoyer in favor of a more flexible
approach with its decision in International Shoe v. VVashington. 36 In International Shoe, a non-resident corporation was
subjected to the jurisdiction of a Washington state court even
See id. at 719.
See id. at 714.
31 See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 4 (West Publishing Company, 6 th
ed. 1993).
32 See id.
33 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714 (1877). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235,
251 (1958).
34 See Pennoyer at 717.
35 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220, 222 (1957).
36 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310 (1945).
29

30
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though its state of incorporation and principal place of business was outside of the forum state. 37 Asserting personal jurisdiction under International Shoe requires a two-step analysis. 3s First, the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with
the forum state. 39 Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."40
In establishing "minimum contacts," the non-resident
defendant must fall under the reach of the forum state's longarm statute. 41 Typically, if the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy due process
then those activities will also bring the defendant under the
jurisdiction of the state's long-arm statute. 42 The Virginia
long-arm statute, for example, authorizes jurisdiction to the
fullest extent permitted by due process. 43
C. JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS AFTER INTERNATIONAL SHOE

Since International Shoe, several cases have presented
the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify and elaborate on the meaning of "minimum contacts" and "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."44 The line of cases
following International Shoe has shown a clear trend toward
expanding jurisdiction. 45 Nevertheless, these decisions have
remained in line with the policy goals of International Shoe of
preventing a state from extending its authority beyond permissible boundaries and preventing a defendant from litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. 46
37

38

See id. at 310.
See Rannoch, Inc. v. The Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (E.D. Va.

1999).
39
40
41

42

See
See
See
See

International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
id.
Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
George B. Delta & Jeffrey H. Matsuhara, Law of the Internet, §3.02[A]

(2000).

See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
45 See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. See also World· Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
46 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
43
44
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In World-Wide Volkswagen Cor:p v. Woodson,47 the United
States Supreme Court overturned an Oklahoma Supreme
Court ruling that held a New York automobile retailer subject
to the jurisdiction of an Oklahoma court based on the forseeability that the car would enter Oklahoma. 48 In ruling that
forseeability alone is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum state should be such that he
reasonably anticipates being haled into court in the forum
state. 49
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,50 a Michigan resident
entered into a fast-food restaurant franchise agreement with
a Florida corporation. 51 Throughout the franchise relationship,
all agreements, negotiations and contracts between the parties were executed by telephone or mail. 52 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that the franchisee was subject to Florida jurisdiction because he had purposely availed himself of
the benefits and protections of Florida laws when he entered
into the franchise agreement. 53 In other words, the absence of
physical contacts was not enough to defeat Florida's assertion
of personal jurisdiction. 54

D.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CYBERSPACE

In 1996, due process made a leap into cyberspace in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson. 55 In CompuServe, Patterson, a
Texas resident, entered into a contractual relationship with
CompuServe,56 an Ohio corporation, which allowed Patterson
to transmit and post his software product on the CompuServe
World· Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
48 See id. at 297-298.
49 See id.
60 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
51 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466.
52 See id. at 48l.
153 See id. at 482.
54 See id. at 476, 487.
55 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (1996).
56 CompuServe is a computer information service that contracts with individuals
to provide computing and information services to subscribers via the Internet. See id.
at 1260.
47
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system for other subscribers to use and purchase. 57 When
CompuServe began marketing a similar product, Patterson
threatened suit. 58 In response, CompuServe filed an action in
an Ohio federal court seeking a declaration that it had not infringed upon Patterson's trademark. 59 Consequently, Patterson
moved to dismiss CompuServe's action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 60 The trial court granted Patterson's motion to dismiss stating that Patterson's contacts with Ohio were too tenUOUS. 61 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 62
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached its opinion by
meshing the traditional "minimum contacts" analysis with the
unique set of circumstances presented by activities conducted
in cyberspace. 63 Citing McGee v. International Life Insurance
Company,64 the court determined that Patterson, like International Life Insurance Company, had established a connection
with Ohio when he 1) entered into the Shareware Agreement
with CompuServe, and 2) repeatedly transmitted computer
files from his computer to the CompuServe system. 65 The
court concluded that Patterson created a purposeful and ongoing relationship with CompuServe and, as a result, he should
have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have consequences in Ohio.66 Finding the record replete with ways in
which Patterson purposely availed himself to the benefits and
protections of Ohio law, the court determined that Ohio's assertion of jurisdiction over Patterson did not violate due
process. 67
.
Just six months after CompuServe, Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com 68 provided another significant development in
personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. In that case, Zippo Manufacturing, a Pennsylvania corporation, sued Zippo Dot Dom, a
id. at 1260.
id. at 1266.
id at 1266.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 126l.
id.
id. at 1268-1269.
id. at 1262-1263.
id at 1266, citing McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
id.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265.
id. at 1266.

67

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

GB

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (w. D. Pa. 1997).

57

58
59
60

61
62

63
64
65

66
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California Internet-based news subscription service, in Pennsylvania District Court for trademark dilution, trademark infringement, and false designation. 69 Zippo Dot Com moved to
dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. 70 The District Court denied the motion. 71
In its opinion, the court fashioned a "sliding scale" test to
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction based
on the operation of an Internet web site alone is consistent
with due process. 72 The test is premised on the theory that
whether a forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant is consistent with due process is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. 73 In
other words, the greater the commercial activity over the Internet the more likely it will be that the assertion of personal
jurisdiction with be consistent with due process. 74
The "sliding scale" test posits three points along a continuum. 75 At one end of the spectrum the defendant clearly conducts business over the Internet. 76 For example, personal jurisdiction is proper in cases like CompuServe v. Patterson
where the defendant knowingly enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction via the Internet. 77 At the opposite end of the spectrum a defendant has only posted information on a "passive" web site that is accessible to users in a
foreign jurisdiction. 78 The exercise of personal jurisdiction in
69 See id. at 1121. Zippo Dot Com registered the domain names "zippo.com",
"zippo.net", and "zipponews.com" with Network Solutions, Inc., an Internet domain
name registry service. See id. at 1121, 1121 n.3.
70 See id at 1121.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 1124.
73 See id. at 1124. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1127.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id. See also Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) where the plaintiff's trademark action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction after the court determined that defendant's web site was passive because it
did nothing more than provided users information about the defendant's jazz club. If
a user wanted to visit the defendant's club, he would have to call or visit a ticket outlet and pick up the ticket at the club on the night of the show. See id.
76 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1122.
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these instances violates due process. 79 Finally, in the middle
are situations where the user can only exchange information
with a host computer. 80 In those situations, the court evaluates the commercial nature and level" of interactivity of the information exchanged between the user and host computer to
determine whether as assertion of personal jurisdiction is
proper. 81
Zippo Dot Com, in the opinion of the court, did more than
advertise or post information on a web site. 82 The record
before the court clearly indicated that they were doing business in Pennsylvania over the Internet. 83 Citing International
Shoe, the court stated "the test has always focused on the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state and not
the quantity of those contacts."84 As a result, the court determined that Zippo Dot Com's activities were of a nature and
quality that the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the Western District would not violated due process. 85
Applying similar logic, the same district court that decided Roche reached an opposite conclusion in Rannoch, Inc. v.
The Rannoch Corp.86 Rannoch, Inc., hereinafter "Rannoch-Va,"
a Virginia corporation, provided engineering and computer
services to firms in the aviation, communications and navigation businesses. 87 The Rannoch Corporation, hereinafter "Rannoch-Tx," a Texas corporation, arranged steam railroad train
vacations for individuals as a way of promoting the hobby of
See Roche, 90 F. Supp. at 718.
See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
81 See id. See also Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
In Maritz, the court provides a good analysis of a case in which the court had to evaluate the level of interactivity between the host and user to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction was consistent with due process. See id.
82 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125.
83 See id. The facts before the court indicated that 2% of Zippo Dot Com's subscribers were Pennsylvania residents, Zippo Dot Com actively solicited user names,
addresses, and credit card information from subscribers, and that Zippo Dot Com had
contracted with seven Internet service providers in Pennsylvania to furnish their services to its Pennsylvania customers. See id. at 112l.
84 See id. at 1127.
86 See id. 1126.
86 See Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d 68l.
87 See id at 682. Rannoch-Va owned federal trademarks for different variations of
the term "Rannoch" including "Rannoch" combined with a fanciful "R", "Rannoch Corporation", and "Rannoch". See id.
79

80
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steam railroading. 88 Rannoch-Va sued Rannoch-Tx in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition. 89
The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, citing that there was no evidence
that Rannoch-Tx was conducting business over the Internet in
Virginia. 90 Instead, the court noted that all Rannoch-Tx had
done was post a web page on the Internet with the possibility
that someone in Virginia might access it.91 Under these circumstances, the court said, without more, the exercise of jurisdiction is not consistent with due process. 92
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS

The task before the United States District Court for the.
Eastern District of Virginia in Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc.
was to determine whether the court could assert personal jurisdiction over Worldwide based exclusively on its operation of
the "triallawyer.com" web site. 93 To permit personal jurisdiction, Worldwide must first fall under the long-arm statute jurisdiction of the Eastern District of Virginia. 94 Virginia law extends long-arm statute jurisdiction to the fullest extent
See id.
See id. Rannoch-Va alleged that the Eastern District of Virginia had jurisdiction over the defendant based on its operation of two web sites, "rannoch.org" and
"steam-training.com", which were accessible in Virginia. The web sites provided ways
to contact the defendant, including telephone and fax numbers, mailing address and
email address. Seeid. at 682-683. The sites also provide spaces for potential advertisers to submit their classified listings. See id. at 682. Finally, Rannoch-Va alleged that
the defendant's advertisements in a nationally circulated magazine called "Trains"
also subject it to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court. See id at 683 n.3.
90 See id. at 683. The court found there was no evidence that Rannoch-Tx assisted or made travel arrangements for any person in Virginia, placed any classified
ads on its web sites for products or persons in Virginia, had done business in Virginia, had sold products in Virginia, had held meetings in Virginia, or conducting any
advertising specifically directed to Virginia. See id. Furthermore, Rannoch-Tx was not
authorized to do business in Virginia, owned no property in Virginia, had no bank accounts in Virginia, had no telephone listings in Virginia, had no employees in Virginia, and did not maintain records in Virginia. See ~d.
91 See Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
92 See id at 687.
93 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 714, 716.
94 See id. at 716.
88
89
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permitted by due process. 95 Due process requires that a nonresident defendant maintain "minimum contacts" with the forum state before the forum state may assert jurisdiction over
him. 96 The essence of the analysis, therefore, merges into the
single question of whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Worldwide is consistent with due process. 97 If it is,
then long-arm statute jurisdiction is permissible over Worldwide and the suit may proceed. 98
Since Worldwide's only contact with Virginia was its web
site, the court had to determine whether the nature and quality of those contacts were enough to establish "minimum contacts" and, therefore, be consistent with due process. 99 To do
so, the court applied the reasoning of the "sliding scale" test
borrowed from ZippO.100 The nexus of this court's analysis was
to evaluate the facts of this case in light of the three points
along the "sliding scale" continuum,101 and characterize the
site as active or passive. 102
The record before the court lacked any evidence to establish that the Worldwide web site was an "active" web site. 103
Analogizing Worldwide to Rannoch-Tx in Rannoch, the court
noted that there was no evidence that Worldwide had employees in Virginia, held meetings in Virginia, or sold products in
Virginia. 104 Furthermore, there was no evidence that Worldwide conducted advertising or promotional activity that was
directed specifically to Virginia. 105 In short, the court conSee id.
See id at 717.
97 See id. at 716.
98 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
99 See id. at 715.
100 See id at 717-718. See also Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-1126.
101 A web site can occupy one of three spaces along the "sliding scale" continuum-passive, active or in between. See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 717-718. The assertion of jurisdiction over operators of active web sites is consistent with due process.
See id. at 718. The operators of passive web sites are not subject to jurisdiction in the
forum state because the characteristics of the web site do not satisfy minimum contacts. See id. Finally, jurisdiction in the instances when the contacts fall somewhere
in between these two positions is determined by looking to the commercial nature
and level of interactivity that occurs on the web site. See id.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id.
95

96
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cluded, there was no evidence that Worldwide did anything
more than post information on a web site with knowledge
that someone .in Virginia may access the site. lo6 Numerous
cases have held that this, without more, is not grounds for
the exercise of jurisdiction. 107 Doing so, could lead to nationwide jurisdiction over anyone who posts a web page. lOS Therefore, concluding that Worldwide did nothing to avail themselves of the benefits of Virginia law or purposely direct their
activities at Roche, the court determined that the Eastern
District's exercise of jurisdiction over Worldwide would violate
due process.109

VI.

CRITIQUE

The Eastern District of Virginia correctly dismissed
Roche's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. 110 Once the
defendant raises the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 111 The court, in its determination of
whether personal jurisdiction comports with due process,
should construe all allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and draw the most favorable inferences in favor
of asserting jurisdiction. 112 Even construing Roche's complaint
liberally, however, there is no evidence that Worldwide purposely availed itself to the benefits of Virginia law. 113 As a result, the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the Eastern District of Virginia would violate due process. 114
In light of the limited information provided in the pleadings, there was no evidence to support the Eastern District's
exercise of jurisdiction. Clearly, the major fatal error of this
case was deficient pleadings. That is not to say, however, that
a better set of facts would have led to a different outcome. A
106

107
108
109
110

111
112

113
114

See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
See, e.g., Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
See id at 718-719.
See id. at 719.
See id. at 716.
See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
See id. at 718.
See id. at 719.
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better set of facts may certainly have allowed the case to survive beyond the motion to dismiss.
Better facts and pleadings may have allowed this action
to survive a motion to dismiss because there is something intangible that distinguishes this case from Rannoch or CompuServe. This court based its dismissal on the fact that, in
sum, Worldwide had done nothing to purposely avail itself of
the benefits of Virginia law or purposely direct its activities
towards Roche. 115 In effect, this decision means that only a
Florida court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Worldwide. This position is logically inconsistent with the idea that
an individual can place a web site on the Internet with the
knowledge, and perhaps specific intent, that anyone anywhere
in the world that is connected to the Internet may access the
site and nevertheless be insulated from the jurisdiction of
most of the courts where the site is accessed. In fact, it seems
that what makes the Internet such an attractive commercial
vehicle is its ability to reach such a wide audience. The incongruity lies in the fact that by achieving its apparent purpose
of mass exposure, the Worldwide web site becomes immune
from the jurisdiction of most state courts.
On the other hand, the potential for nationwide or worldwide jurisdiction is equally as troubling. The "sliding scale"
test, like the "minimum contacts" test, attempts to incorporate
both the quality and quantity of a defendant's contacts with
the forum state into the analysis. Nevertheless, there seems
to be the element of the intent of an Internet web site that is
not captured by the quality and quantity analysis of the "sliding scale" test. As a result, this case could spawn a debate
about the propriety of the "sliding scale" test as a method of
due process analysis and whether it leads to just results. Perhaps the answer is that the underlying constitutional guarantees of due process are so important that we would rather
have a plaintiff take his case elsewhere that have a defendant
litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum.
115

See id. at 718.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

Personal jurisdiction and the Internet is an evolving area
oflaw. 116 Nevertheless, the jurisdictional issues that have surfaced by the advent of the Internet are reoccurring ones.
Since International Shoe, the traditional and, more recently,
the cyberspace line of jurisdictional cases have all struggled
with how much contact is necessary for the forum state to justify its exercise of jurisdiction.117 Whether its phrased as the
"sliding scale" or "minimum contacts," CompuServe, Zippo,
Rannoch, and now Roche, all demonstrate that courts are still
concerned with purposeful availment, "minimum contacts",
and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Clearly, while the Internet has pushed the boundary of these
concepts the fundamental concerns remain the same.
Indeed, technological innovation will continue to put pressure on well-established principles of due process. Fortunately, the legal community is well aware of the difficulties
that the Internet presents. In July 2000, the American Bar
Association issued a report entitled "Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet."118 While offering some solutions, the report cautions that its propositions are not
absolute answers.l19 Instead, the authors of the study, the
ABA Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, intend for the report to be the beginning of an ongoing dialogue on the
issue. 120
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